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Abstract
We consider an oligopoly with a principal-agent relationship, in
which a firm’s marginal cost is decreasing in a manager’s managerial
eﬀort and is subject to an additive uncertainty. Two types of firms op-
erate: one displays symmetric information between the owner and the
manager, another presents asymmetric information. We show that if
the marginal cost’s derivative of the manager is suﬃciently small, then
the expected eﬀort level in an asymmetric information firm exceeds
that in a symmetric one. We also show that the expected total output
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1 Introduction
A basic result illustrated in the economics of information is that the asym-
metry of information between principals and agents reduces agents’ eﬀort
levels in an implemented incentive contract in a monopolistic firm. In the
oligopolistic context, however, since the external competition to the firm
aﬀects internal incentives within the firm, the more diﬃcult the external
competition, the higher the eﬀort level agents may choose. In their semi-
nar[OLE3] paper, Fershtman and Judd[1] present diﬀerent insights on why
managerial compensation contracts may not depend solely on realized prof-
its. They also examine how the structure of internal incentives within a firm
interacts with the market structure external to the firm. They construct
an oligopolistic model where the manager of each firm has an incentive to
maximize a linear combination of profits and sales. We also investigate how
the structure of internal incentives within a firm interacts with the market
structure external to the firm, by directing attention to the asymmetry of
information within oligopolistic firms.
We explore the implication of the Laﬀont—Tirole type agency problems
on oligopolistic market outcomes1. In other words, we analyze market
competition in our model by incorporating the principal—agency relation
into each firm in the oligopoly. In particular, we examine how variation
in the mixture of firms with diﬀerent types of information structure aﬀects
the level of managers and welfare in oligopolistic market outcomes. The
main diﬀerence between this study and earlier work is that we consider
an oligopolistic market where some firms exhibit asymmetric rather than
symmetric information between owners and managers.
Thus, in this paper, we consider an oligopolistic competition in which k
(5 n) firms exist with a symmetric information structure and n − k firms
with asymmetric information. We also examine the eﬀect of the number of
firms with symmetric information on the oligopolistic market outcomes and
welfare by conducting comparative statics on k, the number of the symmetric
information firms in the oligopoly. In Section 2, we present a model. We
1See Laﬀont and Tirole[4].
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derive the equilibrium strategies of our perfect subgame in Section 3. In
Section 4, we conduct a comparative static analysis of equilibrium behavior
with respect to k, as derived in Section 3. Section 5 presents some brief
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a Cournot oligopoly model with n firms in which each firm
produces a homogeneous good. The owner of a firm hires a manager and
instructs him or her to improve eﬃciency by reducing marginal production
costs. Assume that each firm has constant returns to technology: Ci = ciqi,
where qi is the quantity of output of firm i (i = 1, · · · , n). A realized
marginal cost ci is expressed as
ci = c0 − ei + ui, (1)
where ei is the cost-reduction eﬀort level of the firm i’s manager, and
ui denotes the cost uncertainty of firm i. For simplicity, assume that
u0is (i = 1, · · · , n) are independent identically uniformly distributed ran-
dom variables on the support [u, u] with 0 < u < u. The probability density
function f(u) of ui is given by
f(u) =
1
u− u, ∀u ∈ [u, u] and f(u) = 0, otherwise. (2)
These distributions are common knowledge. The constant c0 is an in-
trinsic cost and is normalized to zero. We assume that 0 5 ei 5 ui. That
is, the cost reduction due to the manager’s eﬀort is at most ui, since cost
never takes a negative value. The manager can observe marginal cost. We
assume that there are two types of firm with respect to the available infor-
mation system. The first type of firm has a symmetric information system
in which the owner can observe not only the marginal cost but also the real-
ization of cost uncertainty ui. In this case, both the manager and the owner
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of the firm know the realization of cost uncertainty ui.We refer to this type
of firm as a symmetric information firm hereafter2. Another type of firm
with an asymmetric information system also exists, where the owner can
observe the marginal cost ci but not the realization of cost uncertainty ui.
In this case, the realization of marginal cost comprises private information
for the manager, and the owner cannot observe the eﬀort level exerted by
the manager. We refer to this type of firm as an asymmetric information
firm hereafter3. We also assume that the number of symmetric information
firms is exogenously given by k, (k = 0, 1, · · · , n).
When the manager chooses the level of ei, he or she incurs a disutility
of ψ(ei). For simplicity, we assume that the disutility function ψ(ei) is
assumed to be
ψ(ei) =
1
2
se2i , (s > 0). (3)
Both owners and the managers are risk neutral. The utility of firm i’s
manager is expressed as
Ui = wi − ψ(ei) = wi −
1
2
se2i ,
where wi is the manager’s pay. The outside opportunity utility is nor-
malized to zero. The inverse market demand function is assumed to be
linear and is given by p = a − Q, where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is the total output,
and we assume that a > u > 0. The owner’s utility is then given by
Vi = E[πi − wi] = E[(a−
nX
j=1
qj − (ui − ei))qi − wi], (4)
where E is an expectation operator w.r.t. ui. For the owners of sym-
metric information firms, there is no agency problem in the first instance.
We assume that ci is observable and contractible for asymmetric informa-
tion firms. Since the quantity at the Cournot equilibrium is a function of
the value of ci, if ci is observable for firm i’s owner, he or she can write
2Hart[2] calls this type of firm an entrepreneur firm.
3Hart[2] call this type of firm a managerial firm.
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down the contract, forcing the manager to produce, if the quantities are
verifiable, the exact equilibrium quantity. In the first stage, the owner oﬀers
a contract to resolve the agency problem. Through the revelation principle,
for an equilibrium of any mechanism, there exists a truth-telling equilibrium
of a direct mechanism that is equivalent. Therefore, we focus on the di-
rect mechanism defined by {wi(ui), ci(ui)}, where ui denotes the report of
firm i’s manager. The contract oﬀered by the owner takes the following
form: “if the manager announces ui, the owner will pay him or her wi(ui),
when he or she realizes the cost target ci(ui), and will give no reward oth-
erwise”. We also assume the following information structure. In the first
stage, an executed contract within firm i is unobservable to the owner and
firm j(6= i)0s manager, that is, it is private information. Note that this
is true for symmetric information firms. At the beginning of the second
stage, the contracts executed in the first stage become common knowledge,
so each firm can observe the level of its rivals’ marginal costs. In the second
stage, and knowing all firms’ marginal costs, each manager chooses output
to maximize profits.
The timing of the game is as follows.
Stage 0: The manager of firm i observes the realization of ui. In the
symmetric information firm i, its owner also learns the realization of ui.
Stage1: Each owner of the asymmetric information firms oﬀers a con-
tract {wi(ui), ci(ui)} that specifies the wage and target level of marginal
cost contingent on the managers reported value of ui. The manager decides
whether or not to accept the contract. If he or she accepts, he or she reports
ui, the contract is executed and the manager chooses his or her eﬀort level
to reduce the marginal cost to the level ci(ui). If he or she rejects the oﬀer,
the game ends. At this point, contracts executed in other firms are not
observable.
Stage 2: At the beginning of this stage, the contracts executed in the first
stage and the marginal costs become public information, and each manager
chooses the level of output and the profits are realized.
In the above specification, there are no agency problems in the stage of
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market competition. However, the eﬀort level of the owner of the asym-
metric firms made in the contracting stage influences the marginal costs of
firms and the outputs in the market game equilibrium.
3 Derivation of the Equilibrium
In this section, and from the timing of the game specified in the previous
section, we solve the subgame perfect equilibrium. We solve this game
through backward induction. First, let us derive the equilibrium strategies
of the symmetric information firms.
3.1 Derivation of the equilibrium strategies
In the second stage, since the marginal costs (c1, c2, · · · , cn) are common
knowledge, the Cournot—Nash equilibrium quantities are derived as
q∗i =
1
n+ 1
(a− nci +
X
j 6=i
cj) (i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n) (5)
if a− nci +
P
j 6=i cj ≥ 0, q∗i = 0 otherwise. We also have an equilibrium
of gross profits
π∗i = (q∗i )2 =
1
(n+ 1)2
(a− nci +
X
j 6=i
cj)
2 (6)
if a− nci +
P
j 6=i cj ≥ and π∗i = 0, otherwise.
Denote the set of firms in the oligopoly by N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. By as-
sumption, the number of symmetric information firms k (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n)
is exogenously given. We assume that firm 1, firm 2, · · · ,firm k are sym-
metric information firms. Let K = {1, 2, · · · , k} ⊆ N , the set of symmetric
information firms. The set of asymmetric information firms can be ex-
pressed by N ∩KC = {k+1, k+2, · · ·n},where KC is the complement of K.
Note that the owner of the symmetric information firm learns the realization
of ui. The decision problem facing the owner of the symmetric information
firm j ∈ K is
6
max
wj(uj),cj(uj)
1
(n+ 1)2
Euk [(a− ncj(uj) +
X
k 6=j
ck(uk))
2 − wj(uj)]
s.t. wj(uj)− ψ(ej) = wj(uj)−
1
2
s(uj − cj(uj))2 ≥ 0, ∀uj ,
where the constraint above describes the individual rationality condition.
The equality in the constraint holds, since the marginal cost and eﬀort have
a one-to-one correspondence by ej = uj − ci. We can rewrite this problem
into the expected net profit maximization problem w.r.t. ei as follows.
max
wj(uj),ej(uj)
1
(n+ 1)2
Euk [(a−n(uj−ej(uj))+
X
k 6=j
{uk−ek(uk)})2−wj(uj)] (7)
s.t. wj(uj)− ψ(ej) = wj(uj)−
1
2
s(ej(uj))
2 ≥ 0, ∀uj ∈ [u, u]
Since the owner prefers to oﬀer a reward as low as possible, the constraint
must be binding; the net surplus of the manager is reduced to zero. That
is, we have
wj(uj) =
1
2
s(ej(uj))
2,∀uj ∈ [u, u] . (8)
Substituting (8) into the maximand of (7), we have
1
(n+ 1)2
[(a− n(uj − ej(uj)) +
X
t 6=j,t∈K
{Eut [ut]− Eut [et(ut)]})2
+
X
t0∈N∩KC
{Eu
t
0 [ut0 ]− Eut0 [et0 (ut0 )]})
2 − 1
2
s(ej(uj))
2], ∀uj .
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The partial derivative of the above expression w.r.t. ej(uj) is given by
2n
(n+ 1)2
[(a− n(uj − ej(uj)) +
X
t 6=j,t∈K
{bu− ESIut [et(ut)]} (9)
+
X
t0∈N∩KC
{bu− EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]}]− s · ej(uj) = 0,
where bu = E[ut] = c+c2 ,for all t ∈ N, since ut are independent identically
uniformly distributed random variables.
Solving this w.r.t.ej(uj), we obtain
eSIj (uj) =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [a− nuj + (n− 1)bu− X
t 6=j,t∈K
ESIut [et(ut)]
−
X
t0∈N∩KC
EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]], (10)
where the superscripts ‘SI’ (‘AI’) of the expectation operator imply
that the firm is a ‘symmetric (asymmetric) information firm.’ We present
two assumptions.
Assumption 1
s >
2n2
(n+ 1)2
Assumption 2
4n2 + (n+ 1)2s
2n
≥ a ≥ nu
Remember that 0 5 ei 5 ui. Therefore, it is plausible to hold the
following inequality.
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0 5 E[eSIi (ui)] 5 E[ui] = bu, and 0 5 E[eAIi (ui)] 5 E[ui] = bu
Assumption 2 guarantees that these inequalities hold.
Solving (10) w.r.t. ESIuj [ej(uj)], we get
E[eSIj (uj)] =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)[a− bu− (n− k)EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]]. (11)
Noting that ut are independent identically distributed random variables
and taking expectation on both sides of equation (10), we obtain
E[eSIj (uj)] =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [a−bu−(k−1)ESIut [et(ut)]−(n−k)EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]].
Note that ESIut [et(ut)] = E[e
SI
j (uj)] for any t ∈ K and EAIut0 [et0(ut0)] =
EAI [em(um)] for any t
0 ∈ N ∩KC because of the symmetry of the firms that
have the same type of information system.
Substituting (11) into (10) and rearranging terms yields
eSIj (uj) =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)a− nuj
+
(n− 1)((n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)) + 2n(k − 1)
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1) bu
−(n− k)EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]]. (12)
Now, we are ready to derive the equilibrium strategies of the asymmetric
information firms.
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Since the owner of the asymmetric information firm m(∈ N ∩KC) can
observe neither um nor em, the manager can earn a strictly positive infor-
mation rent, Um(um), because of the asymmetry of information. The owner
has to impose the following incentive compatibility constraints when he or
she determines the oﬀer in the first stage:
wm(um)− ψ(um − vm(um)) ≥ wm(u
0
m)− ψ(um − vm(u
0
m)) (13)
for any um and u
0
m in [u, u]. It is well known that we can rewrite the incen-
tive compatibility constraints (13) into the following equivalent conditions:
U
0
m(um) = −ψ
0
(um − cm(um)),
c
0
m(um) ≥ 0, (14)
for piecewise diﬀerentiable functions Um(·) and c(·).4 It is clear that the
functions Um(um) = wm(um) − ψ(em(um)) = wm(um) − 12s(em(um))
2 =
> 0 and cm = um − em(um) are piecewise diﬀerentiable. We can easily
rewrite the inequality (14) as e
0
m(um) 5 1. Replacing wm(um) by Um(um)+
ψ(em(um)), the problem facing the owner of firm m ∈ N ∩KC to solve is
max
Um(um),em(um)
1
(n+ 1)2
Z u
u
{ [a− n(um − em(um)) +
X
t∈K
{ESIuk [ut]−ESIuk [et(ut)]}
+
X
t0 6=m, t0∈N∩KC
{EAIu
t
0 [ut0 ]− E
AI
u
t
0 [et0 (ut0 )]}]2 − Um(um)− ψ(em(um)) }f(um)dum,
subject to
4See, for example, chapter 7 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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U
0
m(um) = −ψ
0
(um − cm(um)), (15)
e
0
m(um) 5 1, (16)
Um(um) ≥ 0, ∀um ∈ [u, u] . (17)
By integrating (15) to yield
Um(um) =
Z u
um
ψ0(em(u))du+ Um(u)
and
U
0
m(um) = −ψ
0
(um − cm(um)) = −sem(um) 5 0,
we can see that the individual rationality constraint (17) is equivalent
to Um(u) ≥ 0. The owner wishes to pay the lowest possible wage to the
manager, and the constraint is binding; that is, Um(u) = 0. The expected
rent to the manager is represented as
Z u
u
Um(um)f(um)dum =
Z u
u
Z u
um
ψ0(em(u))duf(um)dum
=
Z u
u
h(um)ψ
0
(em(um))f(um)dum, (18)
where h(um) =
F (um)
f(um)
. Using (18), the problem facing the owner of firm
m can be reduced to
max
em(um)
1
(n+ 1)2
Z u
u
{ [a− n(um − em(um)) +
X
t∈K
{ESIut [ut]− ESIut [et(ut)]}
+
X
t0 6=m, t0∈N∩KC
{EAIu
t
0 [ut0 ]− E
AI
u
t
0 [et0 (ut0 )]}]2 − ψ(em(um))
−h(um)ψ
0
(em(um)) }f(um)dum,
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subject to
e
0
m(um) 5 1. (19)
Let us solve the above problem by ignoring the constraint (19). We
observe that f(um) =
1
u−u and h(um) = um − u. Using these and (3),
diﬀerentiating partially w.r.t. em(um) the above maximand, we obtain the
first-order condition of this optimization without constraint :
2n
(n+ 1)2
[a− n(um − em(um)) + k(bu− ESIuk [eSIt (ut)]) (20)
+(n− k − 1)(bu− EAIu
t
0 [et0 (ut0 )])]− s · em(um)− s(um − u) = 0.
Solving (20) w.r.t. em(um), we obtain
eAIm (um) =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [a− num + (n− 1)bu− (n− k − 1)EAIut0 [et0 (ut0 )]
−kESIuk [e
SI
t (ut)]]−
(n+ 1)2s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (um − u). (21)
Substituting (11) into (21) and taking the expectation and rearranging
the terms yields
EAIum [em(um)] =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [
(n+ 1){(n+ 1)2s− 2n}
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)a− num
+
(n+ 1){(n+ 1)s− 2n}
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)bu
−−2n(n− 1) + {(n+ 1)
2s− 2n2}(n− k − 1)
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1) E
AI
um [em(um)]]
− (n+ 1)
2s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (bu− u).
Solving the above w.r.t. EAIum [em(um)], we get
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EAIum [em(um)] =
1
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n} [
2n{(n+ 1)s− 2n}
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)a
−{(n+ 1)3s2 − 2n(n+ 1)(n− k)s− 4n2}bu
+{(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)}(n+ 1)su]. (22)
Substituting (22) into (11) and rearranging yields
ESIuj [e
SI
j (uj)] =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n [a− bu− (n+ 1)(n− k)(n+ 1)s− 2n s(bu− u)]. (23)
By substituting (22) and (23) into (21), we obtain
eAIm (um) =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2
(n+ 1)2s− 2n (a− bu)− n(um − bu)
+
(n+ 1){(n− k − 1)(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n(n− k)− 1)}
{(n+ 1)s− 2n}{(n+ 1)2s− 2n} s(bu− u)]
− (n+ 1)
2s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (um − bu). (24)
From (24) and Assumption 1, we have de
AI
m (um)
dum
= −2n
2+(n+1)2s
(n+1)2s−2n2 < 0, so
the solution (24) of the unconstrained problem satisfies the constraint (19).
Hence, we can see that (24) is the equilibrium eﬀort level of the manager of
the asymmetric information firm.
By substituting (23) into (11), we obtain the equilibrium eﬀort level of
the manager of the symmetric information firm:
eSIj (uj) =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 [
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2
(n+ 1)2s− 2n (a− bu)− n(uj − bu)
+
(n+ 1)(n− k){(n+ 1)2s− 2n2}
{(n+ 1)s− 2n}{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}s(bu− u)]. (25)
Combining (22), (23), (24) and (25), we easily have
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eSIj (uj) = E[e
SI
j (uj)]−
2n2
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (uj − bu) (26)
and
eAIm (um) = E[e
AI
m (um)]−
(n+ 1)2s+ 2n2
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (um − bu). (27)
From (5), (22), (23), (25) and the fact that uj is private information of
firm j in the first stage, a somewhat tedious calculation yields the ex ante
equilibrium quantity of the symmetric information firm j(∈ K):
qSIj (uj) =
1
n+ 1
[a− n(uj − eSIj (uj)) + (n− 1)bu− X
t 6=j,t∈K
ESIut [et(ut)]
−
X
t0∈N∩KC
EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]]
=
(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(a− bu)− n(n+ 1)s(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (uj − bu)
+
(n+ 1)2(n− k)s
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n}(bu− u). (28)
From (5), (23), (24), (25) and the fact that um is private information
of firm j in the first stage, we can derive the ex ante equilibrium quantity of
the asymmetric information firm m(∈ N ∩KC):
qAIm (um) =
1
n+ 1
[a− n(um − eAIm (um)) + (n− 1)bu−X
t∈K
ESIut [et(ut)]
−
X
t0 6=m,t0∈N∩KC
EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]]
=
(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(a− bu)− n(n+ 1)s(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (2um − bu− u)
+
(n+ 1)2s2{(n− k − 1)(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n(n− k)− 1)}
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n} (bu− u).
(29)
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Taking the expectation of (28) and (29), we obtain the expected equilib-
rium quantities of firm j(∈ K) and firm m(∈ N ∩KC) :
E[qSIj (uj)] = E[
(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(a− bu)− n(n+ 1)s(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (uj − bu)
+
(n+ 1)2(n− k)s
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n}(bu− u)]
=
(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(a− bu) + (n+ 1)2(n− k)s{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n}(bu− u)
(30)
and
E[qAIm (um)] =
(n+ 1)s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(a− bu) + (n+ 1)s(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 ·
{−(k + 1)
2(n+ 1)3s2 + 2n(n+ 1)(n(k + 2) + 1)s− 4n3
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n} }(bu− u).
(31)
From (28), (29), (30) and (31), we see that
qSIj (uj) = E
SI
uj [q
SI
j (uj)]−
n(n+ 1)s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (uj − bu) (32)
and
qAIm (um) = E
AI
um [qm(um)]−
2n(n+ 1)s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 (um − bu). (33)
Remarks
Note that the cost reduction due to the manager’s eﬀort is at most ui.
If 0 5 EAI [em(um)] 5 bu and 0 5 E[eSIi (ui)] 5 E[ui] = bu, then we have from
(11)
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E[eSIj (uj)] =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)[a− bu− (n− k)EAIut0 [et0(ut0)]]
5 2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(n− k + 1)[a− bu] 5 bu.
We can show that the final inequality holds under Assumption 2, i.e.
a 5 (n+ 1)
2s− 2n(n− k)
2n
bu < 4n2 + (n+ 1)2s
2n
bu. (34)
Rearranging (20) and taking the expectation of both sides w.r.t. um
yields
EAI [em(um)] =
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1) [a−bu−kESIuk [eSIt (ut)]]− (n+ 1)2s(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1)(bu−u).
If 0 5 EAI [em(um)] 5 bu and 0 5 E[eSIi (ui)] 5 E[ui] = bu, then the
right-hand side of the above equation has to satisfy
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1) [a− bu− kESIuk [eSIt (ut)]]− (n+ 1)2s(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1)(bu− u)
5 2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1) [a− bu]− (n+ 1)2s(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1)(bu− u)
<
2n
(n+ 1)2s− 2n(k + 1) [a− bu] 5 bu,
where the first inequality follows from inequalities 0 5 ESI [em(um)] 5 bu,
the second follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that bu−u > 0. The third
inequality implies that a 5 (n+1)
2s−2nk
2n bu, but this follows from Assumption
2, since a 5 (n+1)
2s−2nk
2n bu < (n+1)2s+2n22n bu.
We are now ready to present the main results concerning the equilibrium
outcome.
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3.2 Properties in the equilibrium outcome of each firm
At first, we present the results of both the expected eﬀort level of managers
of symmetric information firm j(∈ K) and the asymmetric information firm
m(∈ N ∩KC).
Proposition 1 EAIum [em(um)] > E
SI
uj [e
SI
j (uj)] , for
2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2nn+1 ,
EAIum [em(um)] 5 ESIuj [eSIj (uj)], for
2n
n+1 5 s.
Proof. From (22) and (23), we have
EAIum [em(um)]− E
SI
uj [e
SI
j (uj)] = −
(n+ 1)s
(n+ 1)s− 2n(bu− u). (35)
The right-hand side of (34) has a positive (negative) sign, if 2n
2
(n+1)2
< s <
2n
n+1(
2n
n+1 5 s), since Assumption 1 and bu = u+u2 > u.
It is well known that the expected eﬀort level of the manager of
the asymmetric information firm is always higher than that of an symmetric
information firm in a monopoly setting, since the owner facing asymmetric
information has to pay more through information rent. The result obtained
in Proposition 1 states that if we extend the model to Cournot oligopoly
with a principal—agent relationship in each intrafirm, the existence of market
competition can reverse this result if some conditions hold. That is, when
s,the extent of the derivative of the marginal disutility of the manager, is
suﬃciently large, the expected eﬀort level of the manager of the symmetric
information firm is higher than that of the asymmetric information firm
in an oligopoly setting. This is the same result as in a monopoly setting.
When s is suﬃciently small, however, the reverse holds. The expected eﬀort
level of the manager of the symmetric information firm is lower than that
of the asymmetric information firm. Note that this result is robust with
respect to a change in the number of symmetric information firms, since
the diﬀerence of the expected eﬀort levels of the two firms given does not
depend upon k. (See (34).)
The expected utility of the manager of the asymmetric information firm
exceeds that of the symmetric information firm. We can easily show the
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following corollary.
Corollary 2
For, m ∈ N ∩KC , and j ∈ K,
EAI [Um(um)] > E
SIUj(uj) = 0.
Using the result shown in Proposition 1, we can provide a stronger result
concerning the equilibrium managers’ eﬀort levels in both types of firm.
Under the symmetry within the same type of firms, we define the left hand-
side of the first-order condition for the owner of a symmetric firm (removed
subscript j of uj) (9) as a manager’s Marginal Net Value of eﬀort in a
Symmetric Information firm, and denoting this by MNV SI(u), then (9) is
expressed as
MNV SI(e) ≡ 2n
(n+ 1)2
[(a− n(u− e) + (k − 1){bu− ESIut [et(ut)]}
+(n− k)(bu−EAIu
t
0 [et0 (ut0 )])]− s · e = 0.
Similarly, denoting the left-hand side of the first-order condition for the
owner of an asymmetric firm (removed subscriptm of um), (20) byMNV
AI(e),
then we can rewrite (20) into
MNV AI(e) ≡ 2n
(n+ 1)2
[(a− n(u− e) + k{bu− ESIut [et(ut)]}
+(n− k − 1)(bu− EAIu
t
0 [et0 (ut0 )])]− s · e− s(u− u) = 0.
Then, subtracting both sides of the former from those of the latter:
MNV AI(e)−MNV SI(e) = 2n
(n+ 1)2
{EAI [e]− ESI [e]}− s(u− u). (36)
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Then we can express (20) as
MNV AI(e) =MNV SI(e) +
2n
(n+ 1)2
{EAI [e]− ESI [e]}− s(u− u) = 0,
or equivalently
MNV SI(e) =
2n
(n+ 1)2
{ESI [e]− EAI [e]}+ s(u− u), (37)
and note that eAI(u) becomes the solution of this equation,MNV SI(e) =
2n
(n+1)2
{ESI [e]−EAI [e]}+ s(u−u). On the other hand, the first-order con-
dition (9) is simply written as
MNV SI(e) = 0, (38)
and note that eSI(u) becomes the solution of this equation,MNV SI(e) = 0.
From (35) and (36), we can show that the following result holds.
Proposition 3 eAI(u) > eSI(u) , for 2n
2
(n+1)2
< s < 2nn+1 and u such that
u < bu and eSI(u) > eAI(u) for 2nn+1 < s for ∀u ∈ [u, u].
Proof. From the definition of MNV SI(e) and Assumption 1, dMNV
SI(e)
de =
2n2
(n+1)2
− s < 0. From (34) in the proof of Proposition 1, 2n
(n+1)2
{ESI [e] −
EAI [e]}+ s(u− u) = 2n
(n+1)2
{ (n+1)s(n+1)s−2n(bu− u)}+ s(u− u). For u such that
u < bu, 2n
(n+1)2
{ESI [e] − EAI [e]} + s(u − u) = 2n
(n+1)2
{ (n+1)s(n+1)s−2n(bu − u)} +
s(u− u) < 2n
(n+1)2
{ (n+1)s(n+1)s−2n(bu− u)}+ s(bu− u)
= (n+1)
2s−2n2
(n+1){(n+1)s−2n}s(bu − u) < 0 for 2n2(n+1)2 < s < 2nn+1 . For 2nn+1 < s,
2n
(n+1)2
{ESI [e]−EAI [e]}+s(u−u) = 2n
(n+1)2
{ (n+1)s(n+1)s−2n(bu−u)}+s(u−u) > 0,
for ∀u ∈ [u, u]. Hence we show that the right-hand side of equation (35),
2n
(n+1)2
{ESI [e] − EAI [e]} + s(u − u) < 0,for 2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2nn+1 and u such
that u < bu. While for 2nn+1 5 s, 2n(n+1)2 {ESI [e]−EAI [e]}+ s(u−u) > 0, for
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∀u ∈ [u, u]. Note that eSI , eAI satisfy (35), (36), respectively. Combining
these facts and the decreasing property of MNV SI(e),the result follows.
We can illustrate this result intuitively. In the definition of MNV SI(e),
the first term enclosed in square brackets is associated with the marginal
benefit of eﬀort, while the second term is associated with the marginal cost
of eﬀort of the symmetric information firm. We refer to the former as
strategic eﬀect, since this shows interaction among oligopolistic firms. This
strategic eﬀect does not exist in a monopoly setting. The first term in
(20), which is enclosed in square brackets, corresponds to marginal bene-
fit, the second term is the marginal wage and the third term expresses the
marginal cost due to information rent enjoyed by the manager (agent) of
the asymmetric information firm. We denote the third term as asymmetry
of information eﬀect. There exists asymmetry of information eﬀect in the
monopoly setting. The asymmetry of information eﬀect works to discour-
age manager eﬀort in both settings. As we will consider, however, in the
mixed oligopoly where both symmetric information firms and asymmetric
information firms compete a` la Cournot, the strategic eﬀect diﬀers between
asymmetric information firms and symmetric information firms. This dif-
ference is expressed as the first term enclosed in brackets in (36). It takes a
positive (nonpositive) value if s is suﬃciently small (large) from Proposition
1. The asymmetry of information eﬀect expressed by the second term in
(36), however always takes a negative value. If this positive diﬀerence of
strategic eﬀect dominates the negative asymmetry of information eﬀect, the
manager of each asymmetric information firm has an incentive to select a
higher eﬀort level than that of each symmetric information firm’s manager.
Proposition 3 asserts that this is the case when the realized marginal cost
is lower than its mean and s is suﬃciently small.
Next, we establish the expected quantity levels of the managers of the
symmetric information firm and the asymmetric information firm.
Proposition 4
E[qAIm (um)] > E[q
SI
j (uj)] , for
2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2nn+1 ,
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E[qAIm (um)] < E
SI
uj [q
SI
j (uj)], for
2n
n+1 < s.
Proof. From (30) and (31), some manipulation shows that
E[qAIm (um)]− E[qSIj (uj)]
= − [(k + 1)(n+ 1)s+ (n− k)(n+ 1)
2 − 2n]
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n} (n+ 1)s(bu− u). (39)
For k = 0, the expression in the bracket of the numerator of the last
expression of (37) becomes (n+ 1)s+ n(n+ 1)2 − 2n
= (n+ 1)s+ n(n2 + 2n− 1) > 0, for n ≥ 2. For k ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2, since
(n− k)(n+ 1)2 ≥ 0, so
(n− k)(n+ 1)2 − 2n ≥ −2n. Hence, the same expression, for k ≥ 1 and
n ≥ 2
(k + 1)(n+ 1)s+ (n− k)(n+ 1)2 − 2n ≥ (k + 1)(n+ 1)s− 2n
>
2n2(k + 1)
n+ 1
− 2n
=
2n(kn− 1)
n+ 1
> 0, (40)
where the second inequality follows from Assumption 1. Since we show
that (k+1)(n+1)s+(n−k)(n+1)2−2n > 0, for n ≥ 2 and k = 0, 1, · · · , n,
the last expression of (38) has a positive(negative) sign, if 2n
2
(n+1)2
< s <
2n
n+1(
2n
n+1 < s), given Assumption 1 and bu = u+u2 > u.
An economic intuition of the result obtained in Proposition 4 is obvi-
ous from that in Proposition 1. In our Cournot model, the smaller the
marginal cost of the firm, the larger the equilibrium of output. However,
from (1), the higher the level of manager eﬀort, the smaller the marginal
cost. Therefore, the property of the expected equilibrium output obtained
in the proposition inherits that of the equilibrium expected eﬀort level of
the manager presented in Proposition 1.
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4 Eﬀect of the Increase of Symmetric Information
Firms on the Oligopoly
From the results obtained in the preceding section, we know that the prop-
erties of the expected level of manager’s eﬀort and the expected quantities of
output depend on the initial number of firms with symmetric information k,the
total number of firms in the market n, indicating the extent of the compe-
tition of the market, and the derivative of the marginal disutility of the
manager s.
In the this section, we examine how variation in the mixture of firms with
diﬀerent types of information structure aﬀects the eﬀort level of managers
and the expected consumer’s surplus at the oligopolistic market equilibrium
by conducting comparative statics on k, the number of symmetric informa-
tion firms.
From (30) and (31), the equilibrium total output of the market is given
by
E[Q(k)] = kE[qSIj (uj)] + (n− k)E[qAIm (um)]. (41)
Then, from equations (30),(31) and (39), we obtain the following main result.
Proposition 5 Assume that n ≥ 3.
If k 5 n−12 , then
∂E[Q(k)]
∂k < 0, for
2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2n(n+1) ,
∂E[Q(k)]
∂k > 0,
for 2n(n+1) 5 s. If
n−1
2 < k, then
∂E[Q(k)]
∂k ≥ 0, for
2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2n(n+1) ,
∂E[Q(k)]
∂k 5 0, for
2n
n+1 5 s.
Proof. From equations (30),(31) and (39), we have
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∂E[Q(k)]
∂k = E[q
SI
j (uj)]− E[qAIm (um)]
+k
∂E[qSIj (uj)]
∂k + (n− k)
∂E[qAIm (um)]
∂k
= E[qSIj (uj)]− E[qAIm (um)]
+
−ks(n+ 1)2
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n}(bu− u)
+(n− k) (n+ 1)s
(n+ 1)2s− 2n2 {
−2(k + 1)(n+ 1)3s2 + 2n(n+ 1)ns
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n} }(bu− u)
=
s(n+ 1)
{(n+ 1)2s− 2n}{(n+ 1)s− 2n}(bu− u) ·B, (42)
where B ≡ (n+ 1)(2k− n+ 1)s+ (n+ 1)(n− 2k)− 2n. From Assumption
1, s > 2n
2
(n+1)2
and 2n
2
(n+1)2
< 2nn+1 . Set C =
n2−(2k+1)n−2k
(n−2k−1)(n+1) . We can easily
show that for n−12 < k, s < C ⇔ B < 0 and s ≥ C ⇔ B ≥ 0, and
for k 5 n−12 , s ≥ C ⇔ B < 0, s < C ⇔ B > 0. Define f(k) =
n2−(2k+1)n−2k
(n−2k−1)(n+1) −
2n2
(n+1)2
. Then we see that f
0
(k) = −2 n−1
(n+1)(n−2k−1)2 < 0
and f(0) = n
2−n
(−1+n)(n+1) − 2
n2
(n+1)2
= −n(n−1)
(n+1)2
< 0 for n ≥ 2. That
is, we have C = n
2−(2k+1)n−2k
(n−2k−1)(n+1) <
2n2
(n+1)2
. However, since from Assumption
1 we have s > 2n
2
(n+1)2
> C, we see that for n−12 < k, B > 0, and for
k 5 n−12 , s ≥ C ⇔ B 5 0. From all these facts, we can show the result.
This result shows that the equilibrium expected total quantity either in-
creases or decreases, as the number of symmetric information firms increases.
As the number of firms with symmetric information, k increases, the equi-
librium expected total output may increase and may improve the welfare
of consumers. Whether the equilibrium expected total output expands or
not depends on the initial number of k and the derivative of the marginal
disutility of the manager, s. When the initial value of k is suﬃciently
small (less than half of the total number of firms) and s is considerably
small (large), the equilibrium expected total output decreases (increases).
On the other hand, when k is suﬃciently large (more than the half of the
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total number of firms) and s is considerably small (large), the equilibrium
expected total output increases (decreases). In our simple Cournot model,
the expected consumer surplus is given by a positive quadratic function of
the expected total output. That is, the expected consumer surplus is given
by
E[CS(Q(k)] = 12E[(a− p(Q(k))Q(k))] =
1
2E[(Q(k))
2].
Hence we present the next proposition without proof.
Proposition 6 Assume that n ≥ 3.
If k 5 n−12 , then
∂E[CS(Q(k)]
∂k < 0, for
2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2n(n+1) ,
∂E[CS(Q(k)]
∂k
> 0, for 2n(n+1) < s.If
n−1
2 < k, then
∂E[CS(Q(k)]
∂k 5 0, for
2n2
(n+1)2
< s < 2n(n+1) ,
∂E[CS(Q(k)]
∂k 5 0, for
2n
(n+1) < s.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine a Cournot oligopoly model where each firm pro-
duces and supplies a homogeneous good. We assume that two types of
firm operate with respect to the available information system. In firms
with a symmetric information system, the owner can observe not only the
marginal cost but also the realization of cost uncertainty ui. In firms with
an asymmetric information system, the owner can observe the marginal cost
but cannot observe the realization of cost uncertainty ui. Since a Laﬀont—
Tirole-type agency problem appears in this case, the realization of marginal
cost becomes private information to manager of firm i, and the level of eﬀort
chosen by the manager cannot be observed by the owner of the firm. Pro-
vided that the number of symmetric types of firm is exogenously given by
k, (k = 0, 1, · · · , n), we derive the equilibrium level of the manager of both
types of firm and compare one with another. We show that when the ex-
tent of the derivative of the marginal disutility of the manager is suﬃciently
large, the expected eﬀort level of the manager of the symmetric information
firm is higher than that of the asymmetric information firm in an oligopoly
setting. We also show that when the derivative of the marginal disutility
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of the manager is suﬃciently large, the expected output of the symmetric
information firm is higher than that of the asymmetric information firm in
an oligopoly setting. We show that the manager of each asymmetric infor-
mation firm may choose a higher eﬀort level than that of each symmetric
information firm’s manager, if the realized marginal cost is lower than its
mean and s is suﬃciently small.
Furthermore, we examine the eﬀects of an increase in the number of firms
with symmetric information on the oligopolistic market outcomes, by con-
ducting comparative statics of the equilibrium behaviors with respect to k.
That is, we show that the equilibrium expected total output either increases
or decreases, as the number of symmetric information firms increases. We
find that whether the equilibrium expected total output increases or not
depends on the initial number of k and the derivative of the marginal disu-
tility of the manager s. When the initial value of k is relatively small or
large (is less than or more than half of the total number of firms), the equi-
librium expected total output and the expected consumer surplus decreases
(increases) or increases (decreases), if s is considerably small (large). How-
ever, we have not provided any properties of the expected net utility of the
owner, examination of which is left for our future research.
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